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Operation “Peace Spring” and . . . Chaos in Rojava
On 9 October 2019, Turkey ordered the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and its 
proxies in the Syrian National Army (SNA) to invade Syrian Kurdistan (or Ro-
java) after a fateful conversation between Turkish president Tayyip Erdoğan and 
US president Donald Trump a few days earlier. The White House declared that 
the United States did not endorse the operation but would not obstruct it either. 
And as the unintended consequences, the most stable and peaceful corner of Syria 
was transformed into a messy battleground by an incursion ironically labeled 
“Operation Peace Spring.”
Amid an outbreak of protests and recriminations against the Trump adminis-
tration for its “betrayal” of the erstwhile allies in the struggle against the Islamic 
State (ISIS),1 the following questions must be answered: (1) could such a situa-
tion have been avoided; (2) how will this policy impact on the power and prestige 
of the United States in the Middle East and beyond; (3) what does this incident 
indicate about the use of proxies by the United States in the Middle East and 
beyond; and (4) how does this affect the regional balance of power and major 
powers’ competition in Syria?
 With the benefit of painstaking research on the relations between the United 
States and the Syrian Kurds, this article will endeavor to examine a situation that 
is still unfolding and offer answers to the above four questions, while attempting 
also to identify winners and losers.
An Acrobat’s Act
In reality, this coming storm was expected, owing to the inherent contradiction 
of the overall US policy in Syria after the Siege of Kobani (2014–2015) and the 
start of a “special” relationship between the United States and the Yekineyen Para-
stina Gel (YPG, People’s Protection Units), a primarily Kurdish militia. The 
*This article is an updated version of the authors’ previous publication in the Wild Blue Yonder digital journal: 
http://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Wild- Blue- Yonder/Article- Display/Article/2013791/the- us- withdrawal- and 
- the- scramble- for- syria/.
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United States adopted a narrow counterterrorism mission (i.e., the destruction of 
ISIS) without particular concern for the future (and wider) implications of such a 
short- sighted policy. In light of the incompetence of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), 
a decentralized band of Syrian rebels, against ISIS and the extremism of several 
of FSA units (formerly supported by the West), the Pentagon resolved to over-
look the objections of Ankara and partner with the most trustworthy boots on the 
ground against ISIS—the YPG.2
(Flikr photo courtesy Kurdishstruggle, https://www.flickr.com/photos/kurdishstruggle/)
Figure 1. Erstwhile allies. Beginning in 2014, US forces partnered with the YPG against 
ISIS in Syria. In 2015, the YPG joined other Syrian groups to form the Syrian Democratic 
Forces (SDF), comprising the SDF’s leading component. Turkey considers the YPG to be the 
Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a US- designated terrorist organization 
that has waged a decades- long insurgency in Turkey. Ankara has strongly objected to US 
cooperation with the SDF. While US officials have acknowledged YPG–PKK ties, Washing-
ton considers the two groups to be distinct.
As the Islamic Caliphate declined, the Rojava or Syrian Kurdistan appeared—
to the alarm of Ankara.3 The emergence and expansion of an independent Kurd-
ish state—especially one controlled by an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party (PKK), a Kurdish militant and political organization based in Turkey and 
Iraq4—was considered the top threat for Turkey, especially in the aftermath of the 
failed talks between President Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
and PKK (2013–2015).5 Turkey twice unilaterally intervened in 2016 and 2018 to 
disrupt YPG operations and piece- by- piece dismantle the Rojava west of the Eu-
phrates River—even allying itself with Russia to accomplish Ankara’s ends.6 Thus, 
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Washington was confronted with a stark dilemma: how could the United States 
satisfy the security concerns of Turkey and stop the rapprochement between 
Erdoğan and Russian president Vladimir Putin, on the one hand, and defend 
Rojava from Ankara, Damascus, and Tehran on the other hand?
A “prisoner of geography,”7 Rojava could be sustained only through indefinite US 
support. Thus, Washington oscillated between its NATO ally (Turkey) and its part-
ner in the victorious war against ISIS (the YPG), proposing half- formulas (such as 
the “security mechanism” in August 2019) to avert a conflict in northeast Syria.8
A Perfect Storm
However, the US military strategy in Syria was subjected to two independent 
variables in this equation: presidents Trump and Erdoğan. The latter was stead-
fastly committed to dismantling Rojava and, if possible, expanding the borders of 
Turkey according to the “National Pact.”9 And the former, loyal to the “America 
First” doctrine, favored disengagement from the “endless wars” in the Middle East.
In December 2018, President Trump threatened to withdraw US military 
forces from Rojava after a telephone conversation with Erdoğan. The decision 
was suspended (not reversed as some might have thought) after the resignations 
of the Secretary of Defense and the Special Presidential Envoy for the Global 
Coalition against ISIS. However, in October 2019 Trump surprised his cabinet 
once again—after yet another conversation with Erdoğan. With the Ukrainegate 
allegations prominent in the news and the American election campaign in full 
swing, Trump decided to adopt a “fight forward” policy that would promote his 
image vis- à- vis the US public opinion as the president who rejected the costly 
role of the “global policeman.”10
The decision for an end to the “mission creep” in Syria was expected and, to an 
extent, politically understandable. However, the timing and manner of imple-
menting the decision created a “perfect storm of calamities.” The Turkish military 
and SNA proxies thrust into northeastern Syria after what appeared to be a “green 
light” by Washington, throwing the most stable corner of Syria into chaos.11 Tur-
key capitalized on the self- contradictory US policy in Syria and the passivity of 
the European Union (EU) (which was paralyzed by the fear of new migratory 
flows from Turkey to Europe) and seized this unique opportunity to promote 
Ankara’s agenda: the neutralization of this alleged “terrorist threat” (the YPG) in 
Turkey’s soft underbelly through the establishment of a buffer zone deep inside 
the territory of Rojava (32 kms in depth and 446 kms in length) and the resettle-
ment of millions of Syrian war refugees.12
The images of the war crimes committed by Turkish proxies and the displace-
ment of civilians sparked an international outcry. Several member states of the 
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EU and NATO already imposed an arms embargo against Turkey, while the 
Trump administration eventually succumbed to pressure from the media and 
Congress and decreed minor sanctions against Ankara. After a six- hour meeting 
between Erdoğan and American vice president Mike Pence on 17 October, the 
warring parties announced a ceasefire. More of a face- saving move for mutual 
relations between Erdoğan and Trump than a genuine deal, this ceasefire would 
expire by no coincidence on the day of the meeting between Erdoğan and Putin. 
The message about who the rising power broker in Syria would be was crystal 
clear: Russia.
Scramble for Northeastern Syria
Though still premature, an assessment of the winners and losers of this crisis 
can be identified. Russia emerged as by far the biggest beneficiary. The tarnished 
credibility of the United States in the Middle East and the rupture within NATO 
amount, in an irony of fate, to welcomed gifts to Russia from a US president al-
ready accused of being too friendly toward the Kremlin. Hitherto active only in 
Syria west of the Euphrates River, Russia has now expanded its influence east of 
the Euphrates River in a sphere of operations traditionally under US control and 
acts as an arbiter between Syrian president Bashar al- Assad and the Kurds as well 
as between Assad and Erdoğan. And at the same time, Russia continues to con-
solidate its newfound ties with Turkey in the military and diplomatic area to the 
detriment of NATO.
Iran is another power that gained from the US withdrawal. Not only was the 
dream of an independent Syrian Kurdistan dismantled but also the United States 
was expelled from northeastern Syria without a single shot. Iran can now act more 
freely to secure the Shiite Axis (Tehran–Baghdad–Damascus–Beirut) and use the 
momentum domestically against its own unruly Kurds.
For Assad, Operation Peace Spring delivers a great gift: the withdrawal of the 
United States and the neutralization of a Syrian Kurdistan. Without having to 
fight, Assad recaptured strategic loci such as Manbij and the Tabqa Air Base and 
secured the long frontier with Turkey—with the exception of those territories 
under occupation by the Turkish Army and its Syrian proxies. Obviously the 
question of the price tag attached to such a gift ought to be asked. So should be 
the question of the increased presence of the Turkish Army and its proxies on 
Syrian soil west and east of the Euphrates River. Probably Erdoğan and Putin 
discussed the interrelated questions of Idlib, which is strategically important to 
Turkey where it maintains several observation posts, and Rojava and agreed to a 
quid pro quo behind closed doors. Since Assad is currently preoccupied with Idlib, 
he is most likely saving his answer for later.
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Turkey is another winner. Although Ankara did not achieve its maximalist 
goals, it did accomplish a tactical victory—most notably, the legitimization of its 
cross- border operation against “the justified terrorist threats” and the occupation 
of foreign territory without the consent of Syria. Turkey can now sit at the nego-
tiation table for the next day in Syria with several cards in its hands. These tactical 
gains, however, may be overshadowed by the mid- and long- term fallout from the 
United States and the other NATO member states and Ankara’s new “hostage- 
like” bond with Russia. Worse, the reference to the Adana Pact of 1998 in the 
Sochi Summit could result in rising pressure from Russia and Iran toward Turkey 
to pull out completely from Syria and even recognize Ankara’s archenemy Assad. 
Therefore, this win should not be overestimated nor be treated as absolute. Con-
sequently, Ankara would need to sustain a wave of international criticism, part of 
which comes from within NATO member states and goes beyond diplomatic 
disapprovals. Yet, given (mostly domestic) trade- offs, this appears to be a price 
that the Turkish government is willing to accept.
Last but not least, ISIS is evidently a net beneficiary of the chaos in northeast-
ern Syria. As the recent history of this group indicates, whenever chaos ensues 
(e.g., in Iraq’s Kirkuk after the ill- conceived Kurdish referendum for indepen-
dence) ISIS takes advantage of it. And the escape of several ISIS prisoners of war 
and their family members from Kurdish prison camps due to Operation Peace 
Spring will only boost the ongoing ISIS insurgency along the Euphrates River 
and may herald the dynamic comeback of ISIS. Even the death of ISIS leader 
Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi in October of 2019 does not substantially diminish the 
group’s ability to thrive on the disorder in Syrian territory.
Who will be losers from the fallout in Syria? The Syrian Kurds are quite obvi-
ously the biggest losers. The Kurds strategically decided to ink an ad- hoc alliance 
with Assad—thanks to the mediation of Russia. The alternative was far grimmer, 
as the Operation Olive Branch in Afrin had made clear almost two years earlier. 
The dream of an independent Syrian Kurdistan is over, but the fate of the Rojava 
is not decided yet. Rather, it will be the subject of negotiations in the Damascus–
Moscow–Ankara triangle. Yet, without US troops on the ground and in the face 
of a lack of political support, Kurds will most likely be helpless watchers of re-
gional powers’ realpolitik.
Israel lost as well. Tel Aviv had invested in the disruption of the Shiite Axis and 
the debilitation of Turkey by a Syrian Kurdistan. However, the drawn- out elec-
toral crisis in Israel does not permit Tel Aviv to react decisively in the face of 
Trump’s policy change.
Last but not least, the United States could hardly be labeled as a winner. This 
“Twitter- and- phone diplomacy” caused a rift between the Trump administration, 
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on the one hand, and the Pentagon and Congress, on the other hand. Washing-
ton’s not- so- distant goals in the Syrian Civil War were the exclusion of Iran and 
Russia from northeastern Syria and the oil wells in Deir ez- Zor and the preven-
tion of the ISIS’s reemergence. Both of these core objectives have been jeopar-
dized, despite the fact that a few months earlier the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies’ IISS Strategic Comments had warned against such a pullout from 
Rojava.13 This hasty withdrawal sent shockwaves throughout the Middle East, 
since Washington had signaled just a few weeks after the assault on Saudi Aramco 
that the United States will not defend its allies. Putin’s visit to Riyadh and Abu 
Dhabi in October signaled, conversely, the high tide of Moscow’s influence in a 
region traditionally within the US orbit. Yet, given the complex and dynamic 
situation in Syria, Washington still maintains potential power to influence an 
outcome of the war, especially through the conduct of counterterrorist campaigns 
to take down reemerging ISIS and al- Qaeda threats. To do so, the United States 
would need to redeploy and possibly increase the number of American troops in 
Syria, a decision that is rather unlikely to be considered by the Trump administra-
tion in the election year.
It is also worth mentioning that European powers lost as well. Their inability or 
unwillingness to act is not just another blow to the EU’s image as a potential se-
curity actor. More importantly, the EU, by distancing itself from taking responsi-
bility for its nearest southeastern neighborhood, leaves security of proximate re-
gions (both the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East) to outside powers, 
namely Russia, Turkey, and Iran. This powerlessness was strikingly evident when 
the European Council issued a declaration on 21 February 2020 amid a renewed 
military offensive by the Syrian regime and its allies in Idlib, calling the campaign 
“unacceptable” and demanding “all actors to cease hostilities immediately.”14 As 
the EU declared “its call for the situation in Syria to be referred to the Interna-
tional Criminal Court,” Brussels did not offer any unified plan on how to limit the 
violence in Idlib or to bring the Syrian conflict closer to an end.
Withdrawal like Brexit?
The initial argument for the withdrawal of US military forces from Syria, ac-
cording to the Trump administration, was about bringing home American soldiers 
after a “mission accomplished” against ISIS. In that light, it is even more puzzling 
to comprehend the White House’s latest tour de force with the Pentagon’s an-
nouncement on 20 October that US military forces will be deployed around the oil 
wells in Deir ez- Zor to protect them from falling into the hands of the Islamic 
State. Of course, this development only strengthens the hand of the Kurds in the 
ongoing negotiations with Assad (under the aegis of Putin) for the future of Rojava 
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and Syria. At the same time, US forces conducted three raids against ISIS with the 
help of the Kurds in areas under the influence (Idlib) or control (Azaz) of Turkey 
and eliminated key figures of ISIS—most notably al- Baghdadi.
The timing and nature of these operations cannot help but trigger various ques-
tions about the role of Turkey and the relationship between Ankara and the 
Washington. The adoption of a bill in the House of Representatives on the Arme-
nian Genocide and the introduction of additional bills aimed at sanctioning Tur-
key will deepen much further the rift between the two uneasy allies. Meanwhile, 
Russia waits in the corner to pull Turkey further away from NATO. Turkey an-
nounced that it will deepen its cooperation with Russia and, after its exclusion 
from the F-35 program due to the acquisition of S-400 ballistic missiles,15 opt to 
purchase Russian war jets instead. And all these at a time of a deep crisis within 
NATO as exemplified in the recent leaders’ meeting in London for the 70th an-
niversary of the most powerful military alliance.
But the two partners, Putin and Erdoğan, must both walk on a tightrope. The 
start of the offensive in Greater Idlib in mid- December by Assad and his govern-
ment forces’ rapid gains in January16 against the Turkish- backed rebel enclave and 
the support of two different factions in Libya amid the ongoing blitzkrieg by 
Haftar in Tripoli will put to the test the relationship between the two authoritar-
ian leaders. Idlib, in particular, is the biggest test for the two leaders since 2015: 
Turkey will not allow the capture of the rebels’ remaining stronghold in the north 
without a fight and even deployed armed convoys to the northern half of Idlib in 
an attempt to contain Assad’s unrelenting advance.17 The ongoing escalation be-
tween Erdoğan and Assad resulted in the deaths of dozens of soldiers on both 
sides and threatened a direct confrontation between Ankara and Damascus—a 
development that runs counter to the wishes of Putin for a rapprochement be-
tween the two.18 Given the Russian air support for Syrian government forces 
encircling the Turkish military in Idlib,19 Moscow has put itself in a delicate posi-
tion that could quickly lead to a collision course with Ankara. It is in Russia’s and 
Turkey’s mutual interests to deescalate any tensions that would put both sides on 
the verge of a conflict, yet given the deteriorating economic situation of the Assad 
regime, time works in favor of Turkey’s more decisive stance.20
The death of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani in January in a US retaliatory 
strike already affected the situation in Rojava. The tensions between the United 
States and Iran as well as the ongoing protests in Iraq resulted in a further en-
trenchment of the US in northern Syria. This, of course, caused the collapse of the 
negotiations between the Kurds and Assad. And, in an unprecedented act, the 
military commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces, Mazlum Kobani, made 
peace overtures to Turkey.21 A peace deal between the Syrian Kurds and Turkey 
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was always the ideal scenario for Washington, which would open once again the 
pathway to negotiations between Ankara and the PKK and allow the United 
States to extract its forces from the quagmire of Syria.22 Whether Ankara will 
respond positively to these overtures or not will depend on developments else-
where in Syria.
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